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424 IN RE KELLEHER [40 C.2d 
pendent contractors. I have pointed out, however, that their 
position is substantially the same as organized labor. More-
over, that phrase "is not a falsification of facts and 'to use 
loose language or undefined slogans that are part of the con-
ventional give-and-take in our economic and political con-
troversies- like ''unfair'' or ''fascist'' is not to falsify 
facts.' (Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, S1tpra; see 
Park & T.I. Cm·p. v. International etc. of Teamsters, supra.)" 
(In re Blaney, 30 Cal.2d 643, 649 [184 P.2d 892] .) 
I would, therefore, reverse the orders. 
Traynor, J., concurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied April 2, 
1953. Carter, .J., and 'l'raynor, .J., were of the opinion that 
the petition should be granted. 
[Crim. Nos. 5264, 5265. In Bank. Mar. 10, 1953.] 
In re JOHN P. KELLEHER et al., on Habeas Corpus. 
[1] Labor-Jurisdictional Strike Act-Disputes Between Unions. 
-Although a dispute between an employer and one union 
of marine engineers over the terms of a collective bargaining 
agreement may have initiated picketing of the employer's 
premises, after that contract has expired and the dispute 
has become one between that union and another similar union 
as to which should have the exclusive right to represent the 
employer's marine engi:neers the picketing arises out of a 
dispute between two labor organizations, and is within the 
purview of the Jurisdictional Strike Act (Lab. Code, § 1118), 
the employer not having invoked the interference by the 
second union to create a jurisdictional strike situation. 
[2] !d.-Jurisdictional Strike Act-Applicability of Statute.-
Even if marine engineers employed by a steamship company 
are supervisory employees, such fact would not preclude ap-
plication of the Jurisdictional Strike Act to a dispute be-
tween unions as to which of them should have the exclusive 
right to bargain collectively with an employer on behalf of 
such employees, notwithstanding the National Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act of 1947, § 164, declares that the employer 
[1] See 7 Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1945 Rev.), § 31 et seq; Am. 
Jur., Labor, § 178 et seq. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1, 2] Labor, § 21. 
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shall not be compelled to treat supervisory employees as em-
ployees for the purpose of a federal or local law, where the 
Jurisdictional Strike Act does not compel the employer so 
to treat his engineers. 
PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from cus-
tody. Writ denied. 
Delany, \Verchick, F'ishgold & Minudri, J. Paul Madsen, 
Lee Pressman, llobert E. Burns, Crimmins, Kent, Draper & 
Bradley for Petitioners. 
McCutchen, Thomas, Matthew, Griffiths & Greene and Mor-
ris M. Doyle for Respondents. 
SHENK, J.-These are habeas corpus proceedings in which 
petitioners seek release from custody resulting from their 
arrest for picketing in violation of a temporary restraining 
order issued by the superior court in an action pending there-
in entitled Isthmian Steamship Co. et al. v. National Marine 
Eng1:neers Beneficial Assn. et al. 
'l'he restraining order was issued on the basis of the verified 
complaint of plaintiffs in the action, and we turn, therefore, 
to it to ascertain the facts. Plaintiff, Isthmian Steamship 
Company, is a corporation engaged in the business of operat-
ing steamships as a common carrier of interstate and foreign 
commerce aml a part of that business is conducted in Cali-
fornia. Plaintiff, Seaboard Stevedoring Corporation, is a 
corporation engaged in loading and unloading steamships, 
known as stevedoring, and has a contract with Isthmian 
to load and unload its vessels in this state. Defendants are 
a labor union operating as an unincorporated association 
known as National Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, 
referred to herein as M.E.B.A., Marine Engineers Beneficial 
Association No. 97, called Local 97, which is a labor organiza-
tion operating as a corporation and affiliated with, and a local 
unit of, M.E.B.A. and also affiliated with the Congress 
of Industrial Organizations., known as C.I.O., and the officers 
and members of those organizations. The Brotherhood of 
Marine Engineers, referred to as B.M.E., is an unincorporated 
labor organization or union affiliated with the American Fed-
eration of Labor. None of the unions are financed or con-
trolled by plaintiffs. The members of the M.E.B.A. and 
B.M.E. are marine engineers whose work is later described 
herein. 
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Isthmian in its business employs licensed marine engineers 
who are officers in charge of engineroom departments on its 
steamships and as such "have authority, in the interest of 
Isthmian, effectively to recommend the transfer, suspension, 
promotion, discharge, assignment, reward and discipline of 
other employees, to wit, unlicensed engineroom personnel. 
Such engineers also have authority responsibly to direct un-
licensed engineroom personnel and do so direct such per-
sonnel in the ordinary performance of their duties. The exer-
cise by the said engineers of the authority referred to in the 
next two preceding sentences is not of a merely routine or 
clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judg-
ment.'' 
Prior to July 15, 1951, Isthmian had a collective bargaining 
agreement with M.E.B.A. which by its terms expired on that 
day. Prior to March, 1950, the B.M.E. commenced soliciting 
plaintiffs' marine engineer employees for membership in it. 
In March and April of that year Isthmian conducted a vote 
among its engineers to ascertain whether they desired M.E.B.A. 
or B.M.E. to represent them as collective bargaining· represen-
tative, which resulted in a victory for M.E.B.A. Nevertheless, 
B.M.E. continued to solicit for members among Isthmian's 
engineers, and on May 14, 1951, advised Isthmian that it had 
a majority, but Isthmian continued to recognize and deal 
with M.E.B.A. under the bargaining contract with it. About 
two months before the expiration of that contract M.E.B.A. 
demanded provisions for a hiring hall and closed shop in a 
new contract. Isthmian refused, and on July 16, 1951, 
M.E.B.A. called a strike of the former's engineers, and com-
menced picketing its vessels. By letter, on August 2, 1951, 
B.M.E. renewed its demand to represent Isthmian's engineers, 
and on August 15th, the latter requested proof of its right to 
representation, whereupon B.M.E. exhibited pledge cards 
signed by 128 of Isthmian's 204 engineers and accordingly 
B.M.E. and Isthmian entered into a collective bargaining-
contract which did not contain closed shop or hiring hall 
clauses. M.E.B.A. was advised of that contract but continued 
to picket and demanded that it be recognized as exclusive 
bargaining agent. The B.M.E. have also picketed vessels 
whose owners recognize M.E.B.A. It is alleged that the picket-
ing of Isthmian by M.E.B.A. "arises out of a controversy 
between the M.E.B.A. and the B.M.E. as to which of them has 
or should have the exclusive right to bargain with Isthmian, 
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as an employer, on behalf of licensed marine engineers, as 
employees of Isthmian." 
As a result of the picketing, longshoremen employed by 
plaintiff Seaboard Stevedoring Corporation, have refused to 
cross the picket lines and Isthmian has been unable to load or 
unload its vessels to the injury of its business. 
The temporary restraining order issued on August 29, 1951, 
enjoined defendants from picketing for the purpose of in-
ducing Isthmian to recognize them as the exclusive bargain-
ing agent for its engineers in violation of its agreement with 
B.M.E. pending a hearing of an order to show cause why a 
preliminary injunction should not issue. Petitioners, in viola-
tion of the order, were picketing on August 30th and were 
arrested for violating the statute which provides that: ''Every 
person guilty of any contempt of court, of either of the fol-
lowing kinds, is guilty of a misdemeanor: . . . 4. ·willful dis-
obedience of any process or order lawfully issued by any 
court." (Pen. Code, §166[4].) 
On the assumption that the restraining order was based on 
the Jurisdictional Strike Law (Lab. Code, §§ 1115-1120), 
petitioners assert that that law is unconstitutional and that 
it does not apply to the facts in the instant case. 
As pointed out in Seven Up Bottling Co. v. Grocery Drivers 
Um:on, ante, p. 368 [254 P.2d. 544], the Jurisdictional 
Strike l1aw defines a labor organization (Lab. Code, § 1117), 
declares a jurisdictional strike as therein defined to be un-
lawful and against public policy (Id. § 1115), and gives a 
person injured by its violation the right to injunctive relief 
(I d., § 1116) . .A jurisdictional strike is defined as "a con-
certed refusal to perform work for an employer or any other 
eoneerted interference with an employer's operation or busi-
ness, arising out of a controversy between two or more labor 
organizations as to which of them has or should have the 
exclusive right to bargain collectively with an employer on 
behalf of his employees or any of them, or arising out of a 
controversy between two or more labor organizations as to 
which of them has or should have the exclusive right to have 
its members perform work for an employer." (I d., § 1118.) 
We he 1 d that that law did not violate the free speech, press 
and assembly guaranties of the Constitution in the Seven Up 
case. Petitioners assert, however, that the picketing here in-
volved did not arise out of a dispute between two unions as 
required by section 1118, because the dispute between Isthmian 
and M.E.B.A. which resulted in the strike and picketing on 
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July 16, 1951, and thereafter, all existed prior to the entry of 
B.M.E. on the scene; that the dispute at that time was solely 
between Isthmian and M.E.B.A. over the terms of a collective 
bargaining agreement, as the election in April, 1950, among 
Isthmian's engineers had resulted in victory for M.E.B.A. 
and B.M.E. was therefore out of the picture. 
[1] We cannot agree. As seen, it is alleged in the com-
plaint that after the election and collective bargaining agree-
ment with M.E.B.A., B.M.E. continued to solicit Isthmian's 
employees for members, and in May, 1951, told Isthmian it 
had a majority. In August, 1951, after the strike was called 
and picketing commenced. B.M.E. renewed its demand on 
Isthmian that it recognize it as bargaining agent and fur-
nished proof that it represented a majority, which resulted 
in a collective bargaining agreement between B.M.E. and 
Isthmian. M.E.B.A. was advised of that contract but "has 
continued to insist that it is the collective bargaining represen-
tative of licensed marine engineers employed by plaintiff 
Isthmian, and has continued picketing Isthmian's vessels,'' 
and finally it is alleged, as heretofore quoted, that the picket-
ing arises out of a dispute between M.E.B.A. and B.M.E. 
While it may have been a dispute between Isthmian and 
M.E.B.A. alone over the terms of a collective bargaining 
agreement which initiated the picketing, it has now become a 
dispute between M.E.B.A. and B.M.E. as to which should 
represent Isthmian's engineers, and the picketing thus arises 
out of a dispute between two labor organizations. True, 
M.E.B.A. wanted certain clauses in a new col1ective bar-
gaining contract when it called the strike, but now B.M.E. 
insists on its right to be the exclusive bargaining ag-ent and 
has a contract, and it follows that the dispute over the terms 
of a contract drop into the background because M.E.B.A. 
would have to be the representative of Isthmian's engineers 
and recognized as such before any effective action could be 
taken concerning the terms of the contract. That is to say, 
the dispute is now between it and B.M.E. as to which one 
shall be bargaining agent for the engineers. M.E.B.A. 's de-
mand for a closed shop and hiring hall necessarily means that 
it be the exclusive bargaining representative. The facts do 
not present a case where the employer invoked the interference 
by another union (B.M.E.) to create a jurisdictional strike 
situation. On the contrary, B.M.E., as far as appears, acted 
entirely on its own. Isthmian entered into a contract with 
B.M.E. because it furnished proof that it represented a rna-
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jority of its engineers rather than as a means of creating a 
jurisdictional dispute. DeWilde v. Scranton Bldg. Trades etc. 
Counc'il, 343 Pa. 224 [22 A.2d 897], relied upon by petitioners, 
is not in point. '!'here Pennsylvania had a law barring in-
junctions in labor disputes except disputes in disregard or 
breach of a collective bargaining agreement. An A.F. of L. 
union claimed it had a contract with the employer and the 
uuployer entered into a contract with a C.I.O. union. The 
l:Ourt held the exception did not apply because the purpose of 
it was to protect the employer from activities by the employees 
or their representatives in violation of an existing agreement 
between them, that is, to in some measure insure compliance 
with the contract. 
[2] It is contended that the Jurisdictional Strike Law 
does not apply, because the engineers are supervisory em-
ployees; that Isthmian is engaged in interstate commerce, 
and under the National Labor Management Relations Act 
of 1947 (29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq.) no state can regulate 
such disputes between such employees and an employer. Re-
liance is plaeed partieular ly on the seetion reading: "Nothing 
herein shall prohibit any individual employed as a supervisor 
from beeoming or remaining a member of a labor organization, 
but no employer subjeet to this sub-ehapter shall be compelled 
to deem individuals defined herein as supervisors as employees 
for the purpose of any law, either national or local, relating 
to collective bargaining." (29 U.S.C.A., § 164[a].) Hence 
the state law-the ,Jurisdictional Strike Law-applies. More-
over, it is elear that the claim of petitioners avails them noth-
ing, for accepting their contention, the second clause of the 
section says that the employer shall not be compelled to treat 
supervisory employees as employees for the purpose of a law, 
federal or loeal. 'l'he Jurisdictional Strike Act does not com-
pel the employer to so treat his engineers. If any protection 
would flow from the second clause it would inure to the 
benefit of the employer rather than the employees or their 
UlllOn. 
The writs heretofore issued herein are discharged and the 
petitioners are remanded to custody. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
I reaffirm the views expressed in my dissent in Voeltz v. 
Bakery &: Confectionery Workers, ante, p. 382 [254 P.2d 
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G53], but wish to point out, in addition, that this case empha-
sizes the fallacy of the construction placed by the majority 
on the Jurisdictional Strike Act in the Voeltz case as well 
as in the case at bar. 
Under the collective bargaining agreement between Isthmian 
and M.E.B.A. that expired on July 15, 1951, preferential 
hiring was given to members of M.E.B.A. According to the 
affidavit of Yost, Manager of the Operations Department of 
Isthmian, for all practical purposes all licensed engineers 
employed by Isthmian were required to be members of 
M.E.B.A. B.M.E., however, actively solicited support among 
M.E.B.A. engineers employed by Isthmian and, in the spring 
of 1950, about 30 per cent of the engineers preferred B.M.E. 
and 70 per cent preferred M.E.B.A. The inroads of B.M.E. 
were probably owing to the fact that all other seamen aboard 
Isthmian vessels were members of various A.F.L. maritime 
unions. Isthmian continuously recognized M.E.B.A. as sole 
representative of the engineers and, as expiration of the 1950-
1951 contract neared, negotiated only with M.E.B.A. 
M.E.B.A. demanded a hiring hall, 1 which had been obtained 
from the Pacific Coast steamship companies in 1949 and from 
nearly all other dry-cargo steamship companies on the Atlantic 
and Gulf Coasts in June, 1951. Isthmian refused to sign 
the agreements accepted by the other companies. After ne-
gotiations broke down, M.E.B.A. called a strike, July 16, 
1951. As conceded by Isthmian on oral argument, the em-
ployer at that time considered the strike as a dispute over 
the hiring hall issue, and not as a dispute over which union 
would represent the licensed engineers aboard the vessels. 
When the strike was called, most of the engineers left 
the vessels. Isthmian promptly replaced them with men will-
ing to pass through the picket lines and recommenced ship-
ping operations. The picketing was peaceful at all times. 
On the East and Gulf Coasts the A.F .L. longshoremen disre-
garded the picket lines .and normal operations could be had. 
On the Pacific Coast, however, the independent longshore 
union respected the picket lines and Isthmian turned to the 
1 The requested clause provided: "The Company agrees that when 
hiring any Licensed Engineer other than the Chief Engineer or a First 
Assistant Engineer, the employee shall be obtained through the offices of 
the Association; provided that Engineers so named by the Association 
shall be qualified to fill the available positions, and further provided that 
the Company shall have the right to select men who the Company con-
siders qualified and satisfactory.'' 
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courts to break the strike. On July 30th, Isthmian sought 
an injunction in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County 
on the ground that a strike by supervisors for a closed shop 
was illegal. No reference whatsoever was made in the com-
plaint to any jurisdictional conflict between M.E.B.A. and 
B.M.E. The trial court properly dismissed the complaint 
on August 13th. (Park & T. I. Corp. v. International Broth-
erhood of Teamsters, 27 Cal.2d 599, 603 [165 P.2d 891, 162 
A.L.R. 1426] .) 
On August 20th, Isthmian signed a collective bargaining 
agreement with B.M.E., which now represented a majority 
of the engineers aboard the vessels. The B.M.E. contract 
gave members of the B.M.E. preferential employment2 but 
did not contain the hiring hall clause that was obnoxious 
to Isthmian. It is not surprising, of course, that a majority 
of the engineers expressed preference for B.M.E.; the men 
loyal to M.E.B.A. had left the ships and the men now sailing 
the vessels were willing to break the M.E.B.A. strike. 
After its unsuccessful efforts in the Los Angeles Superior 
Court, Isthmian turned to the San Francisco Superior Court 
for relief against the picketing by M.E.B.A. On August 
27th, it filed an amended complaint, the basis of the tem-
porary restraining order involved in the present habeas corpus 
proceeding. Comparing this complaint with that filed on 
July 30th in I1os Angeles, one discovers that the strike is 
now alleged to be a jurisdictional strike, a controversy be-
tween M.E.B.A. and B.M.E., with Isthmian cast in the role 
of an innocent employer ground between two rival unions. 
Thus at the inception of the strike the only dispute was 
between Isthmian and M.E.B.A. over the addition of a hir-
ing hall clause upon renewal of a collective bargaining agree-
ment. Isthmian adamantly refused to grant the clause and 
a strike followed. Over a month after picketing began, Isth-
mian signed an agreement with a rival union willing to forego 
the hiring hall demand and to break the M.E.B.A. strike. 
At the present time, two unions claim the right to represent 
licensed engineers aboard Isthmian ships: M.E.B.A. repre-
senting the men out on strike, and B.M.E. representing the 
men sailing the ships. The determinative issue in this pro-
ceeding is whether under these circumstances the J urisdic-
2 The elause provided: ''The Company shall have the absolute right to 
seleet the Engineers employed by it from among members in good stand-
ing of the Brotherhood.'' 
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tional Strike Act allowed the employer to obtain injunctive 
relief against the union that initially called the strike. 
As pointed out in my dissent in Voeltz v. Bakery & Con-
fectionery Workers, ante, p. 382 [254 P.2d 553], the 
words ''arising out of a controversy between two or more 
labor organizations'' restrict application of the act to cases 
where the initial picketing by the enjoined union is for one 
of the illegal objectives enumerated in section 1118. For 
example, Isthmian would be protected if it had renewed the 
M.E.B.A. contract and B.M.E. thereafter picketed Isthmian 
to force the employer to break the contract with M.E.B.A. 
and recognize B.M.E. as having the exclusive right to bar-
gain with Isthmian on behalf of the engineers. Again, the 
statute would apply if M.E.B.A. picketed Isthmian for the 
purpose of gaining the exclusive right to perform work 
aboard the vessels that had previously been performed by 
the union representing unlicensed engineroom personnel. 
The majority, however, as in the Voeltz case, interprets 
''arising out of a controversy between· two or more labor 
organizations'' to apply to conflicts between rival unions 
that arise during the course of a previously existing and 
continuing labor dispute between an employer and a single 
independent union. The result is to prevent unions from 
peaceful picketing for traditionally recognized objectives of 
organized labor in all cases where a rival union is willing to 
offer the employer more pleasing terms than the striking 
union. Because of the rivalry between various labor organiza-
tions,3 the proposed interpretation of the act would place 
in the hands of an employer a weapon to enjoin picketing 
in any industry where the entrenched union has rivals eager 
to replace it. 
Of course, an employer has the right to continue his bus-
iness behind picket lines and replace the strikers with other 
workers. And it could be argued that if he should be clearly 
successful in breaking the strike, so that all of his workers 
reject the first union and adhere to the second union, the 
picketing by the first union will no longer arise out of the 
original cause of the strike. Then, perhaps, the supplant-
ing union would be the one entitled to deal with the employer 
and the first union, continuing picketing when its cause is 
hopeless, would be the one interfering and causing the juris-
dictional strike. But this problem is not presented here, 
• At least three unions compete for organization of licensed marine 
engineers: M.E.B.A., B.M.E., and United Mine Workers, Local No. 50. 
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where the only issue on habeas corpus is the propriety of is-
suance of the temporary restraining order violated by peti-
tioners. At the time that order was issued, it is undis-
puted that M.E.B.A. had not lost the strike and, accordingly, 
the picketing still arose from the dispute between M.E.B.A. 
and Isthmian. 
In conclusion, I believe that the Jurisdictional Strike Act 
was designed to protect an employer from the effects of a 
struggle between two or more unions, either for recognition 
as bargaining agent or for a determination of which has the 
exclusive right to perform certain work, in which the em-
ployer is an innocent party. I do not believe that the statute 
was ever meant to protect an employer who is engaged in 
a dispute with his employees and the union of their choice 
over legitimate labor objectives, and who seeks a ban on other-
wise lawful picketing on the ground that he has signed a 
contract with another union willing to fill the jobs of the 
striking workers, thereby himself creating the "jurisdictional 
dispute'' from which he seeks relief. 
In my opinion the petitioners should be released. 
Traynor, J., concurred. 
Petitioners' application for a rehearing was denied April 2, 
1953. Carter, .J., and Traynor, .J., were of the opinion that 
the petition should be granted. 
[S. F. No. 18519. In Bank. Mar. 10, 1953.] 
ISTHMIAN STEAMSHIP COMPANY (a Corporation), et 
al., Respondents, v. NATIONAL MARINE ENGI-
NEERS BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATION et al., Appel-
lants; BROTHERHOOD OF MARINE ENGINEERS, 
AFL et al., Interveners and Respondents. 
[1] Injunctions-AppeaL-In determining whether the facts war-
rant an order granting a preliminary injunction, the court on 
appeal must review the evidence most favorable to plaintiffs. 
[2] Id.- Preliminary Injunction.- A preliminary injunction, 
granted to preserve the status quo, is based on the facts as 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Injunctions, § 112 ; [2] Injunctions, 
§ 50; [3 J Injunctions, § 59. 
